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ABSTRACT

KEYWORDS

A case study was conducted using the lens of second-order change to
examine leadership challenges during litigated-based reform of New
Jersey’s child welfare agency. Six challenges identified included (a) difficulty
implementing the comprehensive reform plan; (b) attempting systemwide
change within a weak infrastructure; (c) leadership instability; (d) unclear
leader roles and responsibilities; (e) poor diffusion of the case practice
model, and (f) weak quality control mechanisms. Three recommendations
for reducing implementation failures included developing rich pictures to
understand system interdependencies, using open communication to facilitate change readiness, and implementing a sustainable quality review
system to guide the change process.
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State public child welfare agencies (CWAs) are large bureaucratic organizations involved in the work
of ensuring the safety, well-being, and permanency of children (Patnaik, 2011). As publicly funded
institutions under government oversight, CWAs must compete for scare resources; obtain and
sustain a highly skilled workforce; recruit, license and train resource families; and achieve organizational goals and tasks within a complex network involving internal agency departments, external
contracted service providers, the court system, community partnerships, and families (Bernotavicz,
McDaniel, Brittain, & Dickinson, 2013).
Executive leaders of CWAs are under public and political pressure to reform failed systems with
track records of poor response to reported child abuse and neglect, decreased funding, lack of
resources, unmanageable caseloads, high worker turnover, and delayed or inadequate service provision (Popa, 2012). In the context of this study, executive leadership refers to government-appointed
leaders within the CWA holding positions at the director level or higher within the organizational
hierarchy (e.g., commissioner, assistant and deputy commissioners, chief of staff, chief administrator,
and department directors) and accountable for program and policy formulation, implementation,
assessment, and oversight (Barbee, Christensen, Antle, Wandersman, & Cahn, 2011).
Decades of CWA failures have prompted use of litigation by child welfare advocates to force
policy makers and child welfare leaders to address chronic deficiencies through systemic policy and
practice changes (Bertelli, 2004). Litigated-based required improvements typically involve increased
funding; improved resource allocation; training and diffusion of a new case practice model (CPM);
and collaborative partnerships with internal agency units, external program and service providers,
stakeholders, political leaders, community organizations, and professional entities (Bertelli, 2004).
Recognizing the importance of leadership to organizational change and improved functioning, the
purpose of the study was to use the lens of second-order change to identify executive leadership
challenges encountered by the New Jersey state CWA executive leadership during litigated-based
system reform and the extent the agency was able to achieve program and process improvements as
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stipulated in the provisions of the court-approved settlement agreement. The study was guided by
the research question: What executive leadership challenges were most salient during development
and implementation of the reform plan to improve performance of the New Jersey CWA during a
period of litigated reform?

Overview of the New Jersey case: Charlie and Nadine H. v. McGreevey
In 1999, Children’s Rights, a national child advocacy group filed a class action lawsuit against the
New Jersey Department of Human Services (DHS) and state CWA, Department of Children and
Families (DCF).1 Children’s Rights alleged that the New Jersey child protection and foster care
system was poorly managed, overburdened, and underfunded and underresourced, with repeat
maltreatment in the foster care system 12 times the national rate (Kosanovich, Joseph, &
Hasbargen, 2005). In June 2003, the court approved a settlement agreement (SA) and appointed
an oversight monitor. At the same time, the governor restructured DCF within DHS and hired a new
commissioner to lead the reform effort. Between 2004 and 2015, the monitor published biannual
reports of DHS/DCF compliance with the provisions of the SA for 11 areas of foster care encompassing 53 specified performance outcomes intended to correct severe deficiencies that created a
system unable to meet the safety, permanency, and well-being needs of children receiving services or
in out-of-home care (see Table 1).
Lack of progress meeting SA requirements resulted in a noncompliance contempt ruling against
New Jersey’s DHS, and in July 2006, a modified settlement agreement (MSA) detailing a two-phase
implementation process was approved by the court (Center for the Study of Social Policy [CSSP],
2007b). Phase 1 (July 2006–December 2008) focused on improving the agency infrastructure then
transitioned to Phase II beginning January 2009 with increasingly higher performance expectations
in direct practice staged over the course of the MSA (Center for the Study of Social Policy [CSSP],
2009a, 2010a). By June 2014, DCF had met only 21 of the 53 Phase II performance measures
specified in the MSA (Center for the Study of Social Policy [CSSP], 2015). In August 2014,
Children’s Rights assumed sole monitoring oversight of DCF’s ongoing reform efforts with court
monitoring expected to end in 2017 (Livio, 2015).

Organizational reform: The role of first- and second-order change processes
The lens of first- and second-order change processes can provide insight into leadership challenges
during implementation of a comprehensive reform plan for system change that facilitates organizational adaptability to internal and external pressures on system functioning through adjusting or
instituting new strategies, policies, and procedures. Watzlawick, Weakland, and Fisch (1974) defined
first-order change as “change that occurs within a given system, which itself remains unchanged” (p.
10). First-order change involves responding to problems within the parameters of existing system
frames of reference and underlying assumptions governing organizational thinking and behavior
(Perkins et al., 2007; Watzlawick et al., 1974). For example, a first-order change would involve hiring
more social workers to improve case management without addressing current case practice protocols
that contribute to poor decision-making and service delivery. Incremental first-order changes can
provide executive leaders with information about how small process or procedural adjustments in an
agency subsystem facilitate or impede more complex fundamental second-order change processes
across the entire system (Foster-Fishman, Nowell, & Yang, 2007; Kerman, Freundlich, Lee, &
Brenner, 2012).
1

The New Jersey child welfare system went through several name changes during the litigated reform. To avoid confusion and for
consistency in the discussion, the New Jersey child welfare system is referred to as the Division of Children and Families (DCF)
throughout the entire discussion. The agency was called the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) when under the auspices of DHS
and was renamed DCF when the agency was elevated to an independent cabinet-level agency.
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Table 1. Primary New Jersey child welfare agency deficiencies and associated performance outcomes required under the Charlie
and Nadine H. v. McGreevey (2003) settlement agreement.
PO
1
2–6, 49
30, 31
24, 29
21, 25
System
System
23, 28
39, 43, 46, 47

7–11, 16–18

34, 38
System

Agency deficiency contributing to lack of child safety, permanency, and well-being
An inefficient abuse and neglect reporting system
“Create a centralized hotline to receive and screen calls from the community which allege abuse and/or neglect”
(Center for the Study of Social Policy, 2009b, p. 55).
Inconsistent and inadequate investigation of allegations of child maltreatment
“Specific training on intake and investigation process, policies, and investigative techniques” (Center for the
Study of Social Policy, 2007a, p. 11).
Abuse, neglect, and repeat maltreatment of children in foster care
“No more than 0.49% of children will be victims of substantiated abuse or neglect by a resource parent” (Center
for the Study of Social Policy, 2009b, p. 36).
Inappropriate placement of children due to an insufficient number of resource family homes
DCF “will eliminate the inappropriate use of shelters as an out-of-home placement for children in its custody”
(Center for the Study of Social Policy, 2007a, p. 10).
Placing sibling groups together or providing for sibling visitation while in foster care
“Child will have at least monthly visits with their siblings” (Center for the Study of Social Policy, 2009b, p. 32).
Inadequately trained fieldworker and supervisory personnel
“Completion of pre-service training and competency exams will be required for all case-carrying workers” (CSSP,
2007b, p. 9).
Intake and adoption worker caseloads well above national standard
“Average caseloads at the standard of 15 families or less and 10 children in out-of-home care or less” (Center
for the Study of Social Policy, 2007a, p. 10).
Multiple child placements while in foster care
“Children entering care will have two or fewer placements during the twelve months from their date of entry”
(Center for the Study of Social Policy, 2009b, p. 35).
Children in out-of-home care not receiving adequate pre-placement and on-going medical and mental
health care.
“Identify a statewide coordinated system of health care . . . for children in out-of-home care” (Center for the
Study of Social Policy, 2007a, p. 11).
Poor case plan management and lack of face-to-face visits by caseworkers with children in foster care and
their parents/guardians
“Develop timely, comprehensive and appropriate case plans with appropriate permanency goals” (Center for
the Study of Social Policy, 2009b, p. 30).
“Caseworker has at least one caseworker visit per month in the child’s placement” (Center for the Study of
Social Policy, 2009b, p. 31).
Poor record of establishing permanency through reunification, adoption, or legal guardianship.
“Develop adoption process tracking system that sets up adoption based on milestones/finalizations” (CSSP,
2007b, p. 12).
An outdated information and case management computer database system.
Roll out of new SACWIS system NJ SPIRIT beginning in 2007 (Center for the Study of Social Policy, 2007a, p.
12).

Source: Charlie and Nadine H. v. McGreevey (2003). System = not included as a performance outcome but considered a critical
function of the agency requiring reform; PO = performance outcome.

Often a key role of the CWA executive leadership during litigated-based reform is to promote
effective systemwide functioning by modifying or replacing existing structures, strategies, policies,
and procedures contributing to poor performance (Kerman et al., 2012; Popa, 2012). The ability of
the agency to achieve its goals and objectives amid competing internal and external pressures and
demands is dependent on leaders having an accurate assessment and alignment of organizational
structures, processes, culture, staff, and technology (Bernotavicz et al., 2013). External pressure to
change existing organizational structures or operations typically come from state or federal mandates, budget restrictions, and requirements to use performance-based contracting of programs and
services. Internal pressure for change often arise from new organizational structures, successions,
and transitions within the leadership hierarchy, reallocating scarce resources, and implementation of
a new CPM (Kerman et al., 2012). Through strategic implementation of first- and second-order
change processes, leaders can move an agency toward becoming a learning organization with the
capacity for open communication, innovation, collaboration, accountability, and adaptability to
respond effectively to problems and demands confronting the agency system (Bernotavicz et al.,
2013; McCrae, Scannapieco, Leake, Potter, & Menefee, 2014; Schein, 2010; Senge, 1990). This
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“adaptive capacity is about the degree to which the system is socially, i.e., by human action, capable
of self-organization and can build and increase the capacity for learning, change, and adaptation in
response to changing external drivers and internal processes” (Hobman & Walker, 2015, p. 38).

Leading for first-order change
Effective system reform from a learning-organization approach involves implementing first-order
incremental changes to create a readiness for adaptive second-order-change processes requiring a
discontinuous paradigm shift in the framework of assumptions guiding organizational functioning
and behavior (Hall, 2011; Kerman et al., 2012; Supovitz & Taylor, 2005; Watzlawick et al., 1974).
Reform efforts relying heavily on a first-order change process generally fail to achieve sustained
improvements because problems within the underlying system structure and capacity that support
policy reform and organizational functioning remain unchanged (Hall, 2011; Perkins et al., 2007;
Supovitz & Taylor, 2005). The reform of New Jersey’s state CWA was intended to alter the status quo
of the underlying structure and operational mechanisms of DCF and move it toward becoming a
learning organization through implementation of first- and second-order-change processes that
strengthened agency capacity to engage in ongoing assessment and proactive adaptation to internal
and external system pressures (Center for the Study of Social Policy [CSSP], 2011a).

Leading for second-order change
A learning organization promotes an agency culture that moves beyond accommodation of new
strategies, policies, and procedures to assimilating new norms, values, and ways of behaving that
support and maintain system change to improve agency functioning and performance (Charland,
2011; Patnaik, 2011). Leader policy making produces strategies and goals linked to fundamental
organizational assumptions, and failure to produce desired outcomes can facilitate a reconsideration
of those assumptions (Hall, 2011). The second-order-change process involves leaders encouraging
critical reflection and a paradigm shift in assumptions by implementing new structures, policy
standards, instruments, and processes guiding individual and group behavior, role responsibilities,
accountability expectations, and fit within the system in relation to achieving the agency mission,
goals, and objectives (Bartunek & Franzak, 1988; Foster-Fishman et al., 2007; Kerman et al., 2012;
Watzlawick et al., 1974). Sustaining improved agency performance is dependent on building and
maintaining an organizational capacity, culture, and infrastructure to support new policies, procedures and practices. Leaders support a second-order paradigm shift in system functioning by
engaging with agency members to understand and change maladaptive overt and tacit cultural
assumptions and ways of being that drive poor agency performance (Foster-Fishman et al., 2007;
Kerman et al., 2012).
In the context of publicly administered state CWA reform, a second-order-change process
involves leaders implementing substantive changes to the organizational system (e.g., reordering
relationships and re-defining member roles and authority) through power, authority, and policy
transformations within and across the different system levels (Kerman et al., 2012; Wilson, 2006). In
learning organizations, second-order-change processes involve engaging agency members in multidirectional communication to develop an understanding of a rationale for the ways new policies and
procedures are linked to achieving agency goals and objectives (Bartunek & Franzak, 1988; Perkins
et al., 2007). Leaders who actively seek ideas and feedback from internal and external members of the
CWA system communicate the importance of, urgency of, and collective responsibility for agency
performance (Bernotavicz et al., 2013). Feedback provides information about organizational adaptation to the change process and guides the use of first-order changes to make adjustments to the
second-order-change process that lead to improved agency functioning (Foster-Fishman et al., 2007;
Perkins et al., 2007).
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Methods
The lens of second-order change was used to explore leadership challenges to implementing systemwide reform of the New Jersey CWA. A review of the literature was conducted to gain an understanding of first- and second-order-change processes and leadership within a human services
organization. A qualitative design employing a case study method was used to (a) explore the role
of leadership in the New Jersey CWA during implementation of litigated-based reform to improve
agency performance; (b) describe the most salient factors related to moving the agency toward
becoming a learning organization using second-order processes; and (c) highlight implications for
professional practice. The case study was used because it provided a means of exploring complex
issues within the real-life context of a publicly administered CWA (Yin, 1994).
Rationale for focal state selected and primary data sources used
The rationale for choosing the New Jersey state CWA as the case subject was based on six criteria: (a)
class action lawsuit involving the entire agency system; (b) reform requirements detailed in a courtapproved settlement agreement; (c) conduct of frequent comprehensive assessments of the entire
agency system; (d) a decade of reform efforts having transpired, giving sufficient time to observe the
effects of leadership activities and policy and procedure changes on organizational functioning; (e)
reform involving systemwide changes; and (f) accessible monitoring reports having detailed agency
progress on achieving performance benchmarks. The data sources included the original and modified settlement agreements, comprehensive reform plan A new beginning: The future of child welfare
in New Jersey (2004), and 19 monitoring reports required under the conditions of the Charlie and
Nadine H. v. McGreevey (2003) lawsuit SA and MSA. The biannual monitoring reports published by
the court-appointed monitor from 2005 to 2015 were selected as a primary data source because the
reports were easy to access, comprehensive (e.g., presented both qualitative and quantitative data),
and covered all aspects of agency functioning in relation to SA/MSA requirements. The observations,
judgments, conclusions, and recommendations included in the monitoring reports were developed
based on review of (a) written materials (e.g., revised policies and practice standards, case reviews,
internal memoranda, meeting minutes, human resources/personnel information, agency case management system data, and agency reports to the state legislature); (b) interviews; (c) in-depth targeted
reviews of select areas; (d) attendance at workgroup and planning meetings; (e) review of assessment
data; and (f) field visits.
Data analysis
Data were analyzed using a documental analysis methodology (Glaser & Strauss, 1965). Document
analysis is applicable to qualitative case studies to produce rich descriptions of a phenomenon, event,
organization, or program (Yin, 1994). The primary documents analyzed included the New Jersey
state reform plan, A new beginning: The future of child welfare in New Jersey (2004), and monitoring
reports. The reports published by the court-appointed monitor served as a source of empirical data
for the case study to assist the researcher in uncovering meaning and developing understanding and
insight about the research problem (Merriam, 1988). The document review was used to identify
leadership challenges experienced by the DHS/DCF executive leadership during development and
implementation of the comprehensive reform plan to achieve the performance improvements
required under the provisions of the SA and MSA. Based on the recommendations of Glaser and
Strauss, steps used in the document analysis process to identify relevant leadership challenges
through data review and category development are presented in Table 2.
A constant comparison methodology was used to search for and identify similarities and
differences through systematic comparisons across data units (Glaser & Strauss, 1965). Major
leadership challenge categories were developed based on an inductive analysis of the data and
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Table 2. Document analysis steps used for the source data review and category development process.
Step 1: Identify pertinent source data and review for relevance to research question
Read through source documents to
Link raw data to prior theory
Review data patterns for relevance to
identify patterns in the data
from the review of literature
research question

Step 2: Develop and refine category List
Develop initial category list relevant
to research question

Examine relationships
among categories in the
initial list

Step 3: Create final category list with descriptions
Hone category list to those
Exam final list of categories against
most salient to the research
original source data for relevance
question
and accuracy

Through an iterative process, modify
categories to create final list relevant to
research question

Provide a description for each category in
the final list

Source: Glasser & Strauss (1965); Strauss and Corbin (1990).

theoretical understanding of leadership and change derived from a review of the literature (Strauss &
Corbin, 1990). The first pass of generating leadership-challenge categories was based on an empirical
process of identifying repetitive content across the corpus of material analyzed (Ryan & Bernard,
2003). Subsequent passes of the data were used to produce rich descriptions of leadership challenges
presented in the research findings. Verbatim text excerpts were selected to illustrate major findings
presented.

Findings
Presented are the findings for six primary leadership challenges identified from analysis of the data
that include (a) slow and inconsistent development and implementation of the comprehensive
reform plan; (b) attempting systemwide change within a weak agency infrastructure; (c) leadership
instability; (d) unclear executive leader roles and responsibilities; (e) poor diffusion of the CPM; and
(f) weak quality control mechanisms.

Challenge 1: Developing and implementing the comprehensive reform plan
One goal of the reform process was to move the New Jersey CWA toward becoming a learning
organization by developing the capacity to engage in ongoing assessment and adaptation to internal
and external pressures on the agency system (Center for the Study of Social Policy [CSSP], 2011a).
The DHS/DCF executive leadership had ongoing difficulty achieving oversight panel approval for
several key areas of the comprehensive reform plan (e.g., training, service provision, placement, and
recruitment) and this contributed to the slow and inconsistent progress during the first year of the
reform implementation (New Jersey Child Welfare Panel [NJCWP], 2004, 2005b). Poor plan
development and insufficient assessment by the DHS/DCF executive leadership of collateral consequences and coordination challenges across the agency system internal and external to DCF
factored into substantial delays in implementing elements of the reform plan several years into the
reform process (e.g., lack of coordination between DHS, resource families, and community service
providers). For example, implementation of the new CPM was delayed due to insufficient capacity
developed to support the training process. Also agency personnel and other program and service
providers were unable to follow case practice protocols because of unresolved installation and
training problems with the new statewide automated child welfare information system (SACWIS)
NJ SPIRIT used for case management. Regarding poor reform-plan development and the slow
process of implementation leading to unattainable target dates, the monitor noted:
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The State’s record in the first year of implementing the reform plan is on the whole a disappointing one. For a
few of the commitments New Jersey made, the State has not taken action; for too many others, it has taken
actions that are late or incomplete or do not meet the test of quality and thoughtfulness. As a result, the overall
progress of the reform effort is considerably less than the Court and the citizens of New Jersey could reasonably
have expected. 6 months ago, in our first monitoring report, we wrote that the reform effort was in need of a
“significant course correction.” That conclusion remains true today, and it is increasingly urgent in view of the
additional time that has passed. (NJCWP, 2005b, pp. 5–6)
At this point, many of the targets and dates set out a year ago are no longer a reliable guide to future progress.
Even if New Jersey does excellent work during the next monitoring period, it is now far enough behind in many
areas that it will be unable to meet some of its commitments. (New Jersey Child Welfare Panel, 2005b, p. 12)

Insufficient attention was given to anticipating changes from a holistic perspective (i.e., envisaging
how a change in one area of the agency might positively or negatively affect functioning in other
areas across the agency system), possible challenges that might arise following the implementation of
new policies and procedures, and the development of alternative plans of action in response to
anticipated challenges (New Jersey Child Welfare Panel [NJCWP], 2005a). DCF executive leaders
struggled to develop strategies for identifying system barriers to integration of key reform policies as
many of the target dates from the SA became unattainable due to slow progress (New Jersey Child
Welfare Panel, 2005b). As a result, the panel and DHS/DCF had to rework the terms of the SA and
come to a consensus about the focus of the reform, the overall direction of plan implementation to
resolve severe agency deficiencies, and the role of the executive leadership in guiding the reform
effort (New Jersey Child Welfare Panel, 2005b). Regarding coordinating the reform process across
the agency system and insufficient attention given to developing alternative plans of action in
response to anticipated challenges, the panel noted:
The leadership team has not yet succeeded in effectively prioritizing and sequencing reform activities to ensure
coordination and consistency. As a result, the component parts of this reform effort do not consistently hold
together and form a coherent whole. . . . An over-emphasis on what have come to be known as “the enforceables,” i.e. the items that the Panel and Court have designated as legally enforceable terms of the Settlement
Agreement with specific dates by which they are to be accomplished. On more than one occasion, the State has
taken actions that we believe were inadvisable. . . . It should be unequivocally clear that, where a particular
action or deadline no longer makes sense or cannot be achieved within the designated timeframe in a way that
is actually good for children and families, New Jersey’s responsibility is to . . . propose an alternative course of
action, not to implement for the sake of compliance. (New Jersey Child Welfare Panel, 2005a, pp. 7–8)

Challenge 2: Inadequate infrastructure to support the reform process
New Jersey’s state child welfare system was under the auspices of DHS, the largest cabinet-level
department in the state government. A primary goal of the reform plan was to facilitate a fundamental shift in how the CWA fulfilled its responsibilities for (a) investigating and responding to
reports of child abuse and neglect; (b) providing appropriate care for children in custody; (c) making
available services for at-risk families; and (d) training agency personnel, resource families, and
external service providers in the principles and application of the new CPM (New Jersey Child
Welfare Panel, 2005b). However, lack of organizational structural capacity to support the CPM
impeded its diffusion through the agency system. During the first year, executive leaders implemented new policies and procedures before addressing the underlying system problems and weaknesses
in DCF necessary to support new practices (e.g., high case loads and sufficient supervisory oversight
of caseworkers) (New Jersey Child Welfare Panel, 2004). Five years into the reform process, DCF
continued to experience problems implementing key components of the CPM such as case planning
and family team meetings. In terms of the lack of organizational structural capacity to support the
CPM, the monitor noted:
During site visits, the Monitor heard from staff about the need for more services that better align with the needs
of children and families and with the vision of the CPM. Without a sufficient quantity and quality of services, a
case practice model will fail; staff cannot successfully engage with families if they cannot offer them the services
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they need. Family teams cannot successfully assist families unless willing, trained and capable partners are
members of the team. (Center for the Study of Social Policy [CSSP], 2007, p. 34)
Given the importance of family teaming to case planning in accordance with New Jersey’s Case Practice Model
and quality case work generally . . . the Monitor believes that DCF must place additional emphasis on building
staff capacity to make FTMs a routine part of case practice. (Center for the Study of Social Policy [CSSP],
2010b, p. 8)

The DCF executive leadership failed to demonstrate the link between the principles of the
comprehensive reform plan and the expected benefits from implementing new policies and procedures (New Jersey Child Welfare Panel, 2005b). Lack of necessary organizational structures and
resources to support the CPM principles coupled with the rapid pace of change impeded the
diffusion of the CPM throughout the entire agency system. As a result, failure to create a readiness
for system change in the agency infrastructure and culture left midlevel managers in local area offices
inadequately prepared to support staff in learning and applying the CPM (Center for the Study of
Social Policy [CSSP], 2007; New Jersey Child Welfare Panel [NJCWP], 2005a). The monitor noted
that the failure to communicate the principles and goals of the plan across the agency system
contributed to lack a readiness for the change process:
New Jersey’s leaders never adequately communicated the reasons for this change, its expected benefits, or its
relationship to the principles and values set out in “A New Beginning,” either to their own staff or to outside
stakeholders. . . . Leaders charged with implementing the reform plan . . . have not routinely and effectively met
some of the fundamental challenges inherent in an effort of this magnitude. . . . We believe that there have been
significant gaps: . . . reinforcing the vision and purpose behind the many changes underway; communicating with
and consistently engaging staff and community partners, and remaining open and accessible to these critical
stakeholders; setting and keeping priorities; attending to the “big picture” and ensuring that the many different
pieces of the reform effort are coordinated with one another. (New Jersey Child Welfare Panel, 2005b, p. 9)
DYFS local offices grappled to train . . . large numbers of new staff, to understand the expectations of the new
Case Practice Model, and to keep up with the rapid pace of change required by the State’s child welfare reform
effort (Center for the Study of Social Policy [CSSP], 2008a, p. 2).

Data management system installation
Reliable data management and information dissemination are essential to a strong infrastructure
to support implementation of a new CPM (Barbee et al., 2011; Bernotavicz et al., 2013;
DeRoberts-Moore, 2006). A long installation process and frequent system enhancements coupled
with the slow transfer of new knowledge and skills learned from pre-service/in-service CPM
training to direct application in the field adversely affected communication, decision-making, case
management, and agency performance (Center for the Study of Social Policy, 2008a). Agency
personnel reported frustration with ongoing difficulty accessing and using NJ SPIRIT, low
confidence in reports generated, slow resolution of system problems, and redundancy in daily
operations (Center for the Study of Social Policy, 2008a). The monitor noted that “Workers
expressed . . . continued frustration with mastering the new computer system (NJ SPIRIT) and in
working around the glitches that still remain with the system” (Center for the Study of Social
Policy, 2008a, p. 2).
The quality review process was compromised because executive leaders were limited in their
ability to track, monitor, and analyze performance of the MSA outcomes across the entire agency
system, especially with contracted service providers regarding which leaders experienced ongoing
problems obtaining timely, complete, accurate, and reliable data (CSSP, 2010a, 2013). A decade after
installation of NJ SPIRIT, DCF executive leaders continued to work on improving use of the data
management system across the agency. The panel noted ongoing problems with installation, training, support, and data reliability.
DCF leadership must fundamentally enhance staff’s ability to use NJ SPIRIT so that the Department can collect
and analyze data and produce timely and accurate reports for individual workers, managers, and the general
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public. It is also apparent that challenges remain in improving staff competency in using the system and aspects
of NJ SPIRIT functioning. (CSSP, 2008b, p. 6)
[A] concern is the inaccuracy of some data in the system which impacts the timeliness and accuracy of the
reports generated by NJ SPIRIT for use by DCF Central Office and DYFS Area Directors and local office
management. This problem has also caused delay in routinely producing management and performance data
for public accountability and for MSA monitoring. . . . Some staff continue to distrust the accuracy of the
reports produced by NJ SPIRIT. (Center for the Study of Social Policy, 2008a, p. 39)
There has been considerable progress in producing data on a range of MSA requirements. However, there are
still some practice elements for which reporting from NJ SPIRIT is not yet reliable, including reporting on case
planning and visitation. (Center for the Study of Social Policy [CSSP], 2011b, p. 162)

DHS and DCF: Creating a cabinet-level state child welfare agency
The organizational structure of DCF (responsible for coordinating services across all divisions of the
CWA) under the umbrella of DHS contributed to inconsistent leadership direction and unclear lines
of authority and power that impeded agency performance (NJDHS, 2004, p. 110). Both DHS and
DCF experienced multiple leadership successions; a problem common to social services agencies
(Mekonnen, Noonan, & Rubin, 2009). Frequent leadership changes in conjunction with crossing or
confusing lines of authority exposed agency members to different conceptions of the reform process
and policy and standards of practice that led to confusion and uncertainty about member and leader
roles and responsibilities during the policy-implementation process (Barbee et al., 2011). The
monitor noted that the highly centralized organizational hierarchy of DHS impeded the ability of
DCF executive leaders to respond to agency needs and expediently make corrective changes at the
local level.
DHS and OCS [later restructured as DCF] are not yet nimble enough to manage a large and complex reform
effort. . . . The changes being put in place do not address a critical part of the problem, the ability of OCS to act
promptly and effectively within the larger Department of Human Services. . . . Under the reform plan, OCS was
to function as an “agency within an agency.” The State’s idea was that OCS would benefit from being part of a
large agency that includes many other programs important to children and families, yet be provided with
substantial authority to direct the reform effort and manage its own infrastructure needs. The reality appears to
us to be very different. The parts of DHS operate largely in isolation from one another, and OCS has not
measurably benefited from its connection to other parts of the agency. At the same time, OCS budget,
personnel, facilities, and contract issues continue to depend in substantial part on decisions made by various
units of DHS. OCS leaders have had to spend a good deal of their time navigating the DHS bureaucracy,
detracting from their ability to focus on implementing reforms in the field. . . . New Jersey has not yet put in
place an organizational structure that supports the implementation of the reform plan. (New Jersey Child
Welfare Panel, 2005b, pp. 10–11)

Agency members and external stakeholders experienced ongoing difficulty working within the
complex agency structure to complete case management tasks, obtain information or resources, and
communicate needs and concerns with the appropriate agency leader. The monitor noted that structuring DCF within the DHS impeded implementation of the reform plan because the leadership hierarchy
structure created role, authority, and accountability barriers that slowed the implementation process.
Many stakeholders have conveyed a sense of frustration and confusion. . . . They say that, with so many
organizational units changing so rapidly, it is difficult to know who is responsible for what and how much
authority anyone in the field really has. These concerns point to the need for substantially more and better
communication between DHS centrally, field operations throughout the State, contract providers, and other
stakeholders. (New Jersey Child Welfare Panel, 2005a, p. 78)

DCF leaders spent considerable time and effort navigating the highly centralized management
structure of the DHS bureaucracy to conduct agency business. Delays occurred due to important
decision recommendations having to move up the DHS hierarchy for review and approval (New
Jersey Child Welfare Panel, 2005b). DCF decisions about budget, personnel, facilities, and contract
issues continued to depend in substantial part on the decisions made by the various units of DHS.
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The DCF executive leadership did not have the authority to hold DHS units accountable for
decisions and actions that were delayed or not taken at all (New Jersey Child Welfare Panel,
2005b). The monitor noted:
OCS is part of the largest Department in State government. Many decisions, both large and small, require
approval or review by a variety of other units in DHS. OCS leadership does not have the authority to hold these
units accountable. Under the best of circumstances, this is a recipe for delay; sometimes it is a recipe for
inaction. New Jersey has not yet demonstrated that it can successfully implement its reform plan within the
existing DHS structure. . . . OCS did not have the authority within the larger Department of Human Services
(DHS) to make critical decisions relating to budget, personnel, and other infrastructure needs. (New Jersey
Child Welfare Panel, 2005a, p. 78)

Following approval of the MSA in 2006, the governor restructured DCF as a cabinet-level agency
separate from DHS and appointed the former commissioner of DHS as the new DCF commissioner
(CSSP, 2007b). The DCF commissioner brought in a new management staff and restructured the
agency to clarify leadership roles, levels of authority and power, and lines of responsibility and
accountability. The goal of restructuring DCF was to facilitate leader communication between the
central office and field offices; internal personnel and external partners reported greater access to
information and enhanced communication with department leaders (CSSP, 2007b).
Challenge 3: Leadership instability
Instability in the executive leadership structure of DHS and DCF contributed to poor progress
meeting performance-outcome targets as outlined in the SA (New Jersey Child Welfare Panel,
2005a). Throughout the reform-plan implementation, DHS and DCF experienced several executive-leadership changes. For example, in 2003 the stability of the executive leadership was interrupted with the appointment of a new DHS commissioner and creation of several new executiveleadership positions that included the investigative, child protection, medical and behavioral health;
family resource recruitment and retention; and worker training arms of DCF. Significant leadership
changes occurred again in 2004, 2008, 2010, and 2012 (Center for the Study of Social Policy, 2008b,
2010b, 2011b, 2012; New Jersey Child Welfare Panel, 2004, 2005a).
Frequent DHS/DCF executive leadership changes (e.g., new hires, vacant positions, and
transfers from one division to another) led to delays in decision-making and lack of accountability due to insufficient, unclear, or overlapping levels of authority (Center for the Study of
Social Policy, 2008a, 2010a, 2012; New Jersey Child Welfare Panel, 2005a). Heightened levels of
uncertainty, confusion, and anxiety placed stress on the reform process and the ability of the
agency system to adapt to internal and external pressures as personnel, external service providers,
and the community adjusted to leader successions and transitions into new positions (CSSP,
2007, 2008a, 2010a, 2011a, 2012, 2014). As a result, the change process slowed as new leaders
spent time becoming familiar with the comprehensive-reform plan, the agency’s progress, and
establishing collaborative relationships with organizational members, stakeholders, political and
governmental entities, and a skeptical general public (Center for the Study of Social Policy, 2008a,
2008b; New Jersey Child Welfare Panel, 2005a).
Challenge 4: Unclear executive leader roles and responsibilities
A significant factor contributing to the slow change process and poor performance outcomes was an
organizational and executive leadership structure with poor role delineation and responsibilities for
developing and managing the benchmarks identified in the agency’s reform plan (New Jersey Child
Welfare Panel, 2005a). To promote clearer lines of leadership, power, and authority, the oversight
panel recommended creating a high-level (at least assistant commissioner) position responsible for
organizational planning and assigning the deputy commissioner of DCF under DHS with the
leadership responsibility and authority over critical support services, including budgeting, human
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resources and personnel, contracting, training, information technology and data analysis, continuous
quality improvement, and facilities management (New Jersey Child Welfare Panel, 2004, 2005a). The
monitor noted:
The organizational structure of DHS does not adequately support the reform effort. In Trenton, multiple units
(in DHS, OCS, DYFS, DCBHS and DPCP) have confusing and overlapping responsibilities, with unclear levels
of authority. As a result, important decisions are delayed or not made, in part because people are uncertain
about who is to make those decisions. In the field, the structure of the new area offices remains unclear, with
leadership from each of three divisions but no one in charge of the entire office or fully accountable for the
system’s performance. . . . The Panel remains unclear who is assuming lead responsibility for this work. (New
Jersey Child Welfare Panel, 2005a, pp. 7, 11)

Finally, leader support was essential to the change process. During the execution of the reform plan,
resolution of implementation issues at the local-area level was hampered due to inadequate communication and support from the executive leadership (New Jersey Child Welfare Panel, 2005b). Often
recommendations made to executive leaders by key stakeholders, community partners, lower level
managers, and supervisors were not acted on expediently because there was insufficient leadership in
place to assess problems and take corrective action (New Jersey Child Welfare Panel, 2005b).

Challenge 5: Poor diffusion of the CPM
Training for agency personnel on the use of the new CPM was an important component of the
litigated reform. A year into the reform process, the DCF executive leadership had failed to develop
and implement a revised curriculum that communicated the principles and promoted development
of required skills to integrate the CPM into daily practice. The monitor observed during the first year
that “All new front-line staff have received training as they began their work, but in the absence of a
new curriculum that training has not been sufficient to prepare them” (New Jersey Child Welfare
Panel, 2005a, p. 77). The monitor also noted that “training is well behind schedule, as are the critical
activities designed to establish a new practice model—developing family team meetings, improving
assessment of child and family strengths and needs, and formulating individualized service plans”
(New Jersey Child Welfare Panel, 2005b, p. 8). Over a decade into the reform process, frontline
workers and supervisors were slow to transfer knowledge and skill from training on the new CPM to
case management practice in the field. The monitor observed that there remained continued
difficulty with diffusion of the CPM as agency members struggled to complete family team meetings,
a fundamental component of the CPM.
The initial Family Team Meeting implementation plan lacked focus on the desired outcomes, did not include
case practice principles or the role of Family Team Meetings in achieving them, and was not integrated or
consistent with other reform strategies—particularly those related to the placement process. (New Jersey Child
Welfare Panel, 2005a, p. 36)
DCF has acknowledged that making FTMs a routine part of case practice has been difficult and is taking longer
than desired, even in offices that have been trained intensively on the Case Practice Model. (Center for the
Study of Social Policy [CSSP], 2011b, p. 70)
Family Team Meetings (FTMs) are intended to work in concert with individualized case planning to support
improved results for children and families. . . . There has been improvement in performance on incorporating
FTMs as a consistent part of DCF’s case practice. The improvement has been slower than desired despite
intensive efforts to train, coach and supervise staff over the past several years. (Center for the Study of Social
Policy [CSSP], 2014, p. 60)

To facilitate full integration of the CPM into case management by the end of 2011, mid-level
managers at the local-office level were given the responsibility for ensuring changes in practice.
Local-area directors were provided with management training to reinforce a sense of accountability
and urgency in the implementation of the CPM (Center for the Study of Social Policy [CSSP],
2009b). The executive leadership continued to demonstrate difficulty in policy clarification and
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implementation guidance in key areas of agency operation (Center for the Study of Social Policy,
2008a). Over the decade of reform efforts, a decline in performance on both quantity and quality of
case plans indicated ongoing difficulty with diffusion of the CPM across the agency system (Center
for the Study of Social Policy, 2009a, 2014). The monitor noted:
There remain mixed results, however, in the level of understanding of the Case Practice Model across DCF
divisions and with partner providers and other stakeholders. . . . The Monitor urges DCF to place more of an
emphasis on providing its partners, such as judges, attorneys and service providers with an understanding of
the fundamental practice changes underway across the State. Without a more integrated and shared approach
to service planning and delivery, the practice changes at DCF that are just beginning to take hold will not
effectively reach all families for whom they are intended. (Center for the Study of Social Policy, 2009a, p. 51)

Challenge 6: Ongoing assessment and quality control
At the start of the reform process, DCF had poor or underutilized assessment and quality control
mechanisms in place. In an initial review of cases to assess the safety of children in state care, the
oversight panel noted quality control deficiencies and lack of results integrity.
Quality Assurance reviews were conducted too late to have any significant impact on the review process. . . .
There might well be significant deficiencies in the QA process. . . . At least one high-profile case, in which very
critical safety issues that should have been readily apparent were not identified, raised concerns about the
credibility of the reviewers’ judgment. (New Jersey Child Welfare Panel, 2004, p. 6)

In 2009, DCF instituted a new state Quality Service Review (QSR) process to facilitate fidelity to
the CPM and to monitor and inform decision-making about policy and procedural adjustments
needed; however, the implementation process was slowed through several delays. The monitor noted
“This process has been delayed several times although now appears to be on track toward implementation. . . . DCF will need to create a process for ensuring that results of the QSR are used for
continuous improvement” (Center for the Study of Social Policy, 2009b, p. 10).
To build trust across the agency system with stakeholders and the public, the DCF executive
leadership gathered information in real time with critical staff to identify local barriers to diffusion of
CPM-based practice, worked cooperatively to develop solutions and implement effective practiceimprovement strategies, and shared openly the findings with members across the agency system
(Center for the Study of Social Policy, 2010b, 2013). The QSR process involved weekly conferences
between DCF executive leaders, area directors, and local office managers to review individual
performance on specific measures for ongoing case plan management (Center for the Study of
Social Policy [CSSP], 2013). The monitor reported that the executive leadership continued to
experience difficulty diffusing the QSR process throughout the agency system, noting, “Certain
key QSR scores that are clear indicators of CPM standards such as Engagement and Family
Teamwork remain low, indicating the need for increased attention” (Center for the Study of Social
Policy, 2013, p. 165). The goal of meeting regularly to review policies and procedures was to increase
identification of local-level practice issues that impeded the change process and improvements in
case practice. However, the quality-review process continued to be a weak area in supervision and
ability of organizational workers to complete daily agency tasks. The monitor noted continued
problems with a weak quality control process.
DCF maximizes the utility of ChildStat meetings by holding them monthly with staff and stakeholders to
identify strengths, areas needing improvement and the service delivery and policy barriers that influence child
and family outcomes. . . . While improved, the QSR ratings remain below levels expected by both DCF
leadership and the MSA and underscore the need for DCF to continue its efforts to bolster the quality of
supervision and its focus on the quality of timely case plans and the case planning process. (Center for the
Study of Social Policy, 2014, p. 7)

HUMAN SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS: MANAGEMENT, LEADERSHIP & GOVERNANCE

143

Discussion
While most litigated reform efforts involve making first-order incremental changes to improve
agency functioning (Kerman et al., 2012), a goal of the New Jersey CWA executive leadership was
to move the agency toward becoming a learning organization with the adaptive capacity to respond
effectively to system pressures and achieve sustainable agency-performance levels. Discussion of the
study findings and implications for professional practice are presented within the context of the
research question that guided the study: What leadership challenges were most salient during
development and implementation of the reform process to improve performance of the New
Jersey CWA during a period of litigated reform?
Using conceptions of first- and second-order-change processes described previously, executive
leadership challenges were identified in the context of developing and implementing a fundamental
shift in organizational functioning (e.g., institutional processes and agency behaviors) of the New
Jersey CWA system designed to meet performance-improvement provisions of a litigated settlement
agreement. Analysis of the state comprehensive reform plan and biannual monitoring reports resulted
in the identification of six executive leadership challenges that are discussed in terms of three overarching challenges that played a substantive role in the agency’s inability to achieve required performance outcomes necessary to exit the litigated MSA and end court oversight resulting from the Charlie
and Nadine H. v. McGreevey (2003) lawsuit. The three overarching challenges include developing a
comprehensive-reform plan (challenge 1), strengthening a weak infrastructure (challenges 2, 5, and 6),
and addressing leadership instability (challenges 3 and 4). Presented in Table 3 is a summary of the
three overarching executive leadership challenges with associated implementation issues and key
factors affecting the second-order-change process and achieving required performance outcomes.
Developing a comprehensive reform plan
Initial implementation of the comprehensive-reform plan was unsuccessful due to systemwidechange processes that were too broad in scope and depth for the existing New Jersey CWA
infrastructure to support. These findings were not unexpected given research demonstrating that
organizational learning cannot take place within an overwhelmed infrastructure lacking capacity to
sustain incremental and second-order-change processes (Bernotavicz et al., 2013; Perkins et al., 2007;
Senge, 1990; Watzlawick et al., 1974). Failure to develop a readiness for the change process so
overwhelmed the DCF system that it could not adapt sufficiently to integrate new strategies intended
to produce performance improvements.
After the failure of the initial reform process, DHS/DCF and the panel created a two-phase reform
plan that slowed the pace of implementation. Phase I was marked by first-order incremental changes
focused on building a readiness for change that included increased resources and improving
communication and collaboration with outside entities to identify agency deficiencies and develop
policies and strategies to address critical weaknesses that impeded the change process. In Phase II of
the reform plan, attention was given to integrating strategies designed to support second-orderchange processes that included a fundamental shift in case management and organizational practice
aligned with the new CPM linked to MSA-specified performance outcomes. Increasing organizational capacity and slowing the implementation of second-order-change processes allowed the
agency system better to assimilate the fundamental shift in organizational practice and begin to
show performance improvements.
Strengthening a weak infrastructure
Phasing in reform provided time for agency leaders to utilize incremental first-order changes to
build organizational capacity and facilitate a readiness for change. Political leaders and DHS/DCF
executive leaders experienced ongoing pressure from Children’s Rights and the court-appointed
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Table 3. Three overarching executive leadership challenges affecting implementation of reform plan.
Developing a comprehensive reform plan
Leadership challenge 1: Developing a comprehensive reform plan
Implementation issues
Key factors
1. Overburdened system lacking organizational capacity to
1. Delayed plan approvable process
adapt to system stressors during change process
2. Chronic undersourcing
2. Failure to gain in-depth picture of infrastructure deficiencies 3. SACWIS unreliability
impeding change process
4. High caseloads
3. Failure to create readiness for change
5. Lack of CPM diffusion
4. Lack of role delineation and accountability for implementing 6. Inadequate quality control system
plan components
Strengthening a weak infrastructure
Leadership challenge 2: Inadequate infrastructure to support the reform process
Leadership challenge 5: Poor diffusion of the CPM
Leadership challenge 6: Ongoing assessment and quality control
Implementation issues

Key factors

1.
2.
3.
4.

Elevate DCF to independent cabinet-level agency
1. Clarified and strengthened DCF leader decision-making
Build organizational capacity
authority to decrease policy-decision delays
Facilitate a readiness for change
2. Decreased caseloads
Clarify leader roles, responsibility, authority, and
3. Increased workforce
accountability structures to provide greater control over the 4. Preservice/inservice training program for new CPM
implementation of change strategies, policies, and
5. Fostered open communication channels
procedures
6. Increased collaboration with internal members, external
5. Establish quality-review process
program and service providers, and the court 6. Improved
problem identification and decision-making among midlevel managers and field-level supervisors
Leadership instability
Leadership challenge 3. Leadership instability
Leadership challenge 4: Unclear executive leader roles and responsibilities
Implementation issues

Key factors

1. Inconsistent leadership
2. Frequent executive leadership transitions and successions
3. Agency member energy focused on sustaining environment
coherence and away from the change process
4. Increased stress on mid-level managers and supervisors due
to poor plan implementation guidance
5. Agency member confusion over leader decision-making
authority, responsibility, and accountability
6. Inconsistence application of new policies and procedures

1. Moving DCF out of DHS
2. Confusing lines of decision-making authority within DHS/
DCF command structure
3. Failure to reinforce vision and purpose behind the reform
plan
4. Ineffective inter- and intra-agency communication
5. Shifting and dropped priorities
6. Not ensuring the right people were in the right job, with the
right skills and resources to complete reform related tasks
7. Lack of delegated accountability for producing results
8. Lack of ongoing evaluation and corrective responses to
facilitate the reform process

monitor to move DCF out from under the umbrella of DHS. Children’s Rights and the monitor
believed that an independent DCF would strengthen the infrastructure and decrease policy-decision
delays by clarifying leadership authority, responsibility, and accountability. Key to strengthening the
CWA infrastructure was promoting a culture of open communication across the agency system.
Kerman et al. (2012) and Bernotavicz et al. (2013) stressed that promoting open communication
channels increased building of consensus that strengthened agency members’ commitment to the
problem-solving and change process. Closed and confusing communication channels within DHS/
DCF contributed to ineffective application of change strategies, slow diffusion of the CPM throughout the agency system, and inconsistent integration of new policy and procedure directives into daily
practice by agency members, contracted service providers, and court personnel. Changing a culture
of silence takes time and while communication was improved across the DCF system network, the
process of rebuilding trust among system members was still a work in progress.
In learning organizations, leaders and agency members engage in critical reflection as part of the
change process; reflecting on system interdependencies, interactions, and mutual influences that
affect agency performance over time by helping to identify where adaptive change needs to take
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place (Bartunek & Franzak, 1988; Foster-Fishman et al., 2007; Hobman & Walker, 2015; Kerman
et al., 2012; Lounsbury & Mitchell, 2009; Watzlawick et al., 1974). A readiness for change is
facilitated by leaders examining agency functioning holistically to anticipate and prepare intervention strategies for problems that may arise at the individual, group, agency, external system, and
governmental levels during implementation of change strategies.
In the case of DCF, the initial ineffectiveness of the reform plan to achieve required organizational
change goals and performance improvements provided an opportunity for leader reflection on basic
assumptions underlying the change process and how plan strategies, policies, and procedures failed
to adequately address system interdependencies. For example, the class-action lawsuit and subsequent SA and MSA brought in funding to provide critical resources essential to building a strong
infrastructure supporting sustained change-based policies and procedures. However, leaders may
have relied too heavily on the assumption that the root problem contributing to poor agency
performance was inadequate resources rather than a failure to identify and manage system interdependencies. Examining components of the reform plan within a holistic context led to a two-phase
change process that supported a fundamental shift in how the agency achieved its goals and
performance objectives. The two-phase process provided time for executive leaders to assess the
effects of policy and procedural changes, clarify job roles and responsibilities related to new policy
initiatives linked to the change process, and create contingency plans to address expected and
unintended implementation challenges (Checkland & Scholes, 1990; Foster-Fishman et al., 2007;
Lounsbury & Mitchell, 2009; Midgley, 2000).
Leadership instability
Leadership stability is vital to implementing second-order-change processes (Barbee et al., 2011;
Bernotavicz et al., 2013; Mekonnen et al., 2009). Creating a readiness for change and guiding the
change process during comprehensive systemwide reform is influenced by the extent executive
leadership successions are minimized and continuity of the implementation process is maintained
during leader transitions (Foster-Fishman et al., 2007; Kerman et al., 2012). Frequent leadership
transitions in DHS and DCF impeded the second-order-change process by contributing to ineffective or inconsistent evaluation of the reform process and slow or absent corrective responses to
implementation problems.
During the initial attempts at implementing the reform plan, delays and interruptions in the change
process were reflected in slow and inconsistent performance gains and failure to meet required benchmarks. The transition from an agency under DHS to a cabinet-level autonomous agency with clearer
role responsibilities, lines of authority, and levels of accountability was turbulent as established leaders
and new leaders found their place and roles within the agency and as part of the change process.
McBeath et al. (2014) pointed out that agency system members will attempt to adjust their environment
to reduce ambiguity and uncertainty by insulating themselves from organizational pressures that are
perceived as irrational or harmful. Ongoing executive-leadership changes and shifting of positions from
one department or system level to another caused confusion and uncertainty within the agency, with
community partners, and among key political and public stakeholders. With frequent leader successions, system members’ capacity for change was weakened as they expended energies toward sustaining
environmental coherence and away from the change process.

Recommendations for improving the implementation process
Based on the analysis of New Jersey’s implementation of litigated-based reform within its child
welfare agency, three recommendations for reducing implementation failures and developing a
learning organization include developing rich pictures to understand system interdependencies,
facilitating a readiness for change through open communication, and implementing and sustaining
a quality-review system to guide the change process (see Table 4).
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Table 4. Recommendations for improving the implementation process.
Recommendation
Develop rich pictures to
understand system
interdependencies a, b

Facilitate a readiness for
change through open
communication

Implementing and sustaining
quality review systems to
guide the change processa, g

Processes
Key implementation components
1. Identify internal processes and external
1. Well-defined agency mission and goals
drivers affecting plan implementation
2. Infrastructure description of:
2. Link new policies and implementation
(a) resources
strategies to:
(b) executive leadership, mid-level
(a) identified system deficiencies and intermanagement and field-level supervisory
dependencies
roles and responsibilities
(b) specific 1st and 2nd order change processes (c) accountability structures
(d) SACWIS data acquisition, dissemination,
use, and reliability
3. Communication patterns across system
network
4. Level of collaboration across the interand intra-agency system
1. Solicit feedback to identify ineffective
1. Provided resources and support to
strategies and inform decision-making to
empower agency members to negotiate
decrease gap between practice expectations
job and agency challenges during the
and actual agency performance
change processd
2. Engage key inter- and intra-agency members/ 2. During Phase I used open communication
stakeholders in change process to identify
to provide rationale for new policies and
policy and procedure barriersc, d, e
procedures and tap into member
3. Reinforce open communication within
knowledge and support to promote
training curriculum and by leaders to
understanding of the change process
facilitate diffusion of reform plan policies
and proceduresf
1. Identify values and norms that support/
1. Use of inter- and intra-agency feedback
hinder the change process
and SACWIS data to identify system
2. Shorten/close gaps in the feedback process to
weaknesses requiring policy and
increase information accuracy
procedural adjustments
3. Use interconnections to facilitate change
2. Inclusion of ChildStat meetings to review/
process across agency subsystems
resolve case management issues

Sources: a. Checkland and Scholes (1990); b. Ragsdell (2000); c. Campbell, Perry, Maertz, Allen, & Griffeth (2013); d. Kerman et al.
(2012); e. Perkins et al. (2007); f. Travis and Mor Barak (2010); g. Foster-Fishman et al. (2007).

Developing rich pictures to understand system interdependencies
Publicly administered CWAs are complex bureaucratic institutions with interrelated tangible (e.g.,
resources, programs and services, training programs) and intangible (e.g., organizational mission, cultural
norms, and trust) infrastructure components functioning together interdependently. Changes implemented in one area of the agency will reverberate throughout the system—and not always as expected or desired
(Checkland, Harrison, Snow, McDermott, & Coleman, 2012). While it is impossible to anticipate all
possible outcomes from policy change, developing a reform plan from a holistic perspective acknowledges
these system interdependencies and reduces the degree to which unexpected outcomes occur.
In the case of DCF, diffusion of the CPM was slow, and this hampered agency activities related to
case management. A rich picture centered on implementation of CPM policies would have increased
opportunities to identify interdependencies not initially evident and improved the development of
implementation strategies aligned with how the principles of the CPM were understood and applied
across the agency network (e.g., external program and service providers and the court system). As a
tool used to facilitate organizational change, executive leaders can utilize information garnered
through rich pictures to implement new policies and changes strategies that take advantage of
system interdependencies in helping to diffuse throughout the organizational system desired shifts
in organizational thinking and behavior.

Facilitating a readiness for change through open communication
Open communication is integral to the change process in a learning organization (Kerman et al.,
2012; McCrae et al., 2014). A reform process is successful only to the extent executive leaders
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understand agency capacity and readiness to adapt to the change process (Checkland & Scholes,
1990; Midgley, 2000). Information and insight gained through open communication across the interand intra-agency system help leaders develop a rich picture of organizational functioning. Rich
pictures provide an in-depth context from which to conduct ongoing assessments to monitor the
level of change readiness. These ongoing assessments inform decision-making about modifications
to the implementation process that would strengthen organizational capacity to support the introduction of new policies and procedures (Kerman et al., 2012; Perkins et al., 2007).
In learning organizations, leaders communicate to agency members that innovation, change, and
reform is an iterative process involving sharing ideas through honest discussion about change
strategies implemented to improve agency functioning and service to agency clients (Fixsen, Blase,
Naoom, & Wallace, 2009). Leaders model and promote open communication by responding to
agency members with meaningful dialogue and continued encouragement to participate in the
decision-making process (Travis & Mor Barak, 2010). By using communication to facilitate change
readiness, leaders create an expectation that barriers to good practice can be examined, solutions
identified, and change strategies implemented.
While agency members, governmental/political leaders, stakeholders, and families initially may
support reform, the change of contextual factors over time often require that leaders re-educate and
re-engage individuals and groups to recommit to the shared vision for reform and persevere through
the change process (Armstrong, Milch, Curtis, & Endress, 2012). Supporting findings from the
literature on the importance of a strong communication infrastructure to creating a readiness for
change, commitment to the change process across the DHS/DCF system was strengthened by
building on the core values and effective work routines and practices already in place in the work
environment and supported by the organizational culture (Bernotavicz et al., 2013; Charland, 2011;
Glisson, 2007; Kerman et al., 2012; McCrae et al., 2014; Patnaik, 2011; Schein, 2010; Senge, 1990).
Implementing a sustainable quality service review system to guide the change process
During the change process in multisystem organizations, leaders often are confronted with obstacles
that impede effective and efficient change (Kerman et al., 2012; Maynard, 2010). The success of any
reform plan is dependent on obtaining timely and reliable assessment of agency performance linked
to new policies. Quality assessment mechanisms serve a vital role in identifying and responding to
barriers that delay or stop the change process. Valuable information is gained through key sources
that include leaders, midlevel managers, supervisors, field-level caseworkers, support staff, mentors
and coaches, clients, and key stakeholders (Baker & Charvat, 2008; Kerman et al., 2012; King,
McKelvey-Walsh, Freundlich, & Brenner, 2011; Wulczyn, 2007).
Utilizing timely and accurate data is essential to ongoing management and oversight of first- and
second-order-change strategies linked to new policies and outcome improvement goals (Armstrong
et al., 2012; Foster-Fishman et al., 2007; Hobman & Walker, 2015; Kerman et al., 2012). During Phase I
of the reform-plan implementation, DHS/DCF executive leaders assessed the implementation process
following first-order incremental changes to identify and strengthen system structures and process to
support second-order changes linked to the agency objectives and performance benchmarks outlined
in Phase II. For DCF executive leaders, installing a systemic quality-review process was an arduous task
beset by delays as system members learned how to apply quality-control processes to organizational
activities amid dealing with technical glitches and a steep learning curve during installation of the new
SACWIS system. An ongoing challenge for DCF executive leaders will be sustaining internal and
external assessments to guide decision-making and policy adjustments in the long-term.

Conclusion
Successful implementation of a systemic plan of organizational change necessitates a strong and
consistent executive leadership able to develop an agency infrastructure and capacity that supports a
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complex array of services and institutional strategies, policies, and procedures aligned with agency
mission, goals, and performance objectives (Armstrong et al., 2012; Hernandes & Hodges, 2003;
Pires, 2002). Executive leaders promote diffusion of desired first- and second-order changes by
building confidence and stimulating enthusiasm around the vision for the agency, communicating
the rationale for change by providing clear and definable goals and objectives with beginning and
ending points linked to outcome benchmarks, modeling norms and routines aligned with the shift in
fundamental assumptions, and supporting positive behaviors facilitating integration of new policies
and procedures into daily practice (Barbee et al., 2011; Kerman et al., 2012).
System change of the New Jersey state CWA had been a slow and challenging process. Even with
political support from the governor and state legislature, institutionalizing substantive second-order
change had been a long-term process that would carry on after DCF existed from the MSA and court
oversight. Achieving agency goals and performance objectives requires ongoing commitment to
diffusion of the best-practice principles of the CPM, fostering a culture of open communication, and
building a strong infrastructure to support adaptive change. While DCF had considerable work left
to do, after a decade of work, reform strategies had brought about positive improvements in key
areas that included application of the CPM to case management, placement of children in out-ofhome care, caseworker visitation, timely access to health care services, programs and services for
older youth in foster care, increased adoption placements, appropriate utilization of NJ SPIRIT for
case management across the agency system, and a stronger quality review process. Ongoing
commitment to the reform effort and change process by the executive leadership and CWA
members moves the agency system toward becoming an autonomous learning organization able to
achieve the mission of providing for the safety, well-being, and permanency of the children of New
Jersey.
Delimitations and limitations
This study had limitations. Establishing power/authority structures and forming collaborative partnerships with stakeholders are essential components to implementing a change process. The scope of the
present study did not address these organizational factors, and future research on the role of power and
the involvement of stakeholders in comprehensive reform would provide additional insight for understanding leadership of publicly administered–child-welfare agencies within the context of litigated
reform. The case study examining reform under litigated performance requirements and courtappointed oversight contributes to the understanding of leadership practices and other moderating
factors that facilitate performance improvements or impede reform progress. The analysis process relied
heavily on monitoring reports published biannually over a 10-year period. The reports contained both
objective data and the subjective opinions of agency leaders and the oversight panel/monitor. The study
would be strengthened and provide a richer picture of the challenges and successes of the reform process
by including insight from external stakeholders, the clientele served by the agency, and the public.
Finally, while the findings of the current study may not be generalizable to other publicly administered
CWAs, conceptual generalizations can be drawn that contribute to understanding leadership during
litigated reform that might be transferable to similar contexts (Yin, 1994).
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